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James M. Hirschhorn*
Every lawyer knows that you can't get an injunction unless
you prove that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury without
one. In The Death of The IrreparableInjury Rule, Professor Douglas
Laycock sets out to prove that what we know isn't so. The book is
an obituary rather than a call to action-its thesis maintains that
the irreparable injury rule is without content, except in preliminary injunction cases, because modern decisions invoking the
rule to deny a permanent injunction actually rest on some other
ground. By treating the rule's demise as an accomplished though
hitherto unrecognized fact, Laycock focuses attention on what he
considers the real reasons for which the courts deny injunctive
relief. His thesis should stimulate debate on the merits of these
reasons.
The irreparable injury rule can be stated in either of two
ways: "no injunction without irreparable injury," or conversely,
"no injunction when there is an adequate remedy at law."
Money damages, of course, are the characteristic legal remedy,
and the irreparable injury rule is traditionally thought to state a
preference for damages over prevention or specific performance.
"Our materialistic society," as one recent formulation puts it,
"considers money damages an acceptable substitute for most recognized interests." 1 The law, in other words, deems damages to
be an adequate remedy in all but the exceptional case.
Laycock opens his argument with a flat challenge to that assumption. "Our legal system," he states, "does not prefer damages." Instead, he describes how courts have evaded the
irreparable injury rule without renouncing it:
Courts have escaped the irreparable injury rule by defining adequacy in such a way that damages are never an adequate substitute for plaintiff's loss. Thus, our law embodies a
preference for specific relief if plaintiff wants it. The principal
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doctrinal expression of this preference is that damages are inadequate unless they can be used to replace the specific thing
lost. Damages can be used in this way for only one category of
losses: to replace fungible goods or routine services in an orderly market. In that context, damages and specific relief are
substantially equivalent. Either way, plaintiff winds up with
the very thing he wanted, and the preference for specific relief
becomes irrelevant. In all other contexts, there is ample basis
in precedent and principle for holding that damages are
inadequate. 2
Unless money itself is what plaintiff wanted out of the transaction,
damages is the plaintiff's preference only if money can buy what he
wanted. Otherwise, money and what it can buy are a second best,
and the rational plaintiff will prefer "the very thing itself," if he can
get it. The law, says Laycock, both should arid does allow that
choice. Instead of a preference for money damages, we have a preference for specific relief when it is possible.
Given that damage suits are the bulk of our civil litigation, this
sounds at first unlikely. It looks rather more plausible, however,
once Laycock narrows the universe of cases and expands the universe of injunction equivalents. First, he concedes, the preference
only matters when a choice is possible: "[s]pecific relief is impossible when the harm has been done beyond anyone's power to prevent or repair in kind. This is true of all personal injury cases. It is
true of most consequential damages whatever the underlying
wrong."' Damages are second best compensation for a life or limb
lost by negligence, but they are the only compensation possible.
Second, rational plaintiffs frequently do not choose specific relief
because they find it quicker, cheaper and simpler to obtain substitute' performance themselves and then sue for its cost. In an orderly
market for fungible goods or routine services, a buyer finds it easier
to cover and sue a defaulting seller for damages than to await victory
in a suit for specific performance. By the same token, the owner of
damaged property ordinarily finds it easier to have it repaired, and
sue for the expense than to compel defendant to repair it.4 When
4-5 (1991).
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Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17. The well-known decision of Whelock v. Noonan, 108 N.Y. 179,

4

LAYcOCK, DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE

16 N.E. 67 (1888), is the limiting case. In Whelock, defendant had covered plaintiff's
land with enormous boulders to a depth of 14 feet. Id. at 183, 108 N.Y. at 68.
Rather than pay the high cost of removing them up front, plaintiff sought an injunction to compel defendant to do so. The court granted the injunction, emphasizing
the extraordinary cost and complication for plaintiff not only to remove the stone,
but also to acquire land on which to dump it lawfully. Id. at 68-69, 15 N.E. at 183-
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transaction costs are taken into account, in these cases, specific relief is less adequate than self-help plus damages. Third, when a
plaintiff does choose specific relief, the available remedies extend
beyond the injunction and even beyond those remedies historically
administered by the equity courts to whatever functionally gives
plaintiff relief in kind. Specific performance of a contract is specific
relief; so are the traditionally legal remedies of ejectment, replevin,
and mandamus. 5
To illustrate the inadequacy of damages, Laycock uses decisions
which granted specific performance of ordinary commercial contracts in times of shortage. Ordinarily, he argues, damages are an
adequate remedy for breach of contract to sell goods for which
there is a reply market because replacements can be had in the market. Laycock concludes, "[w]hen plaintiff gets identical goods either
way, the choice between legal and equitable remedies hardly matters. '"6 Specific performance has been granted when the orderly
market for such ordinary goods as cotton, jet fuel, and even
automobiles breaks down in times of shortage precisely because
plaintiff cannot use money damages to buy the equivalent
replacement.7
Laycock's thesis, then, is that when a plaintiff has a choice between damages and specific relief, and when his own interests lead
him to choose specific relief as more adequate, the courts will honor
that choice unless defendant interposes some countervailing reason.
85. The innocent owner of a newly discovered toxic waste dump may find herself in
a similar predicament and seek the same relief; the innocent owner of a car with a
dented fender will simply pay the body shop and sue for damages.
5 LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 22. Laycock categorizes remedies as either "substitutionary," which provide money in recompense for harm, or "specific," which aspire to prevent harm or undo it rather than let it happen and compensate for it.
The former include compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and restitution of the money value of defendant's gain. Specific remedies include injunctions, specific performance and restitution of specific property or money. Id. at 1213.
6 Id. at 39.
7 Id. at 40 nn.46-55. The automobile cases cited by Laycock illustrate the importance of being able to buy an equivalent replacement. Manufacture of civilian
cars was prohibited during World War II from 1942 through 1946. Several courts
during and immediately after this era granted specific performance of contracts to
buy a car on the ground that a substitute car could not be had; others denied it on
the ground that substitutes were available on the grey market, albeit at a higher
price. Id. at 140 n.52. See also Heidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., 166 Kan. 11, 14,
199 P.2d 481,483 (1948); Boeing v. Vandover, 240 Mo. App. 117, 130, 218 S.W.2d
175, 177-78 (1949); DeMoss v. Conart Motor Sales, 72 N.E.2d 158, 160 (Ohio
Com. Pl. 1947), aff'dfor want of proper record, 149 Ohio St. 2d 299, 73 N.E.2d 675
(1948).
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Damages that cannot buy the equivalent of defendant's rightful behavior are not "as complete, practical and efficient" as specific relief
and are therefore not an adequate remedy.' The question to be addressed in every case where the plaintiff seeks some kind of specific
relief therefore becomes, in Laycock's view, "why not the best remedy" rather than "why the extraordinary one?" Rather than a global
reason

-

the absence of irreparable injury

-

he finds specific pro-

cedural or substantive reasons restricted to particular cases.
Laycock substitutes for a unitary irreparable injury rule approximately fifteen distinct reasons why specific relief will not be granted
even though it is superior to damages.' Unique among them, and
amounting in Laycock's view to the bulk of the cases invoking the
irreparable injury rule,' ° are the cases denying preliminary relief.
Those are distinct from cases involving final relief because they are
decided on relatively short notice, with less than a full hearing and
in circumstances where it is unclear whether plaintiff will establish a
claim to permanent relief of any kind on the merits. The familiar
balancing tests for preliminary relief therefore weigh the severity of
plaintiff's injury and the strength of her claim against the defendant's right to a full hearing, its interest in continuing conduct not yet
shown to be unlawful and the court's interest in avoiding error
through premature decision. Although damage relief is inferior to
prevention, plaintiffs may thus be compelled to await damage relief
for preventable injury by the court's uncertain knowledge of the
legal and factual basis of their claim at the preliminary stage. The
uncertainty is real, and in Laycock's view provides the basis for the
irreparable injury rule in interlocutory relief cases.
Laycock strongly contrasts the permanent injunction stage
where "the merits are resolved, defendant is a known wrongdoer,"
8 LAYcOCK, supra note 2, at 22.

9 Id. at 265-76. According to Laycock, these reasons include deference to another forum ("Our Federalism," exhaustion of administrative remedies, arbitration, and separation of powers); avoiding "over-enforcement" (balancing the
equities, the rule against prior restraints, and refusal to enforce personal service
contracts); substantive hostility (labor injunctions); harm to innocent third parties;
protection of civil or criminal jury trial; ripeness and mootness; and practical difficulty of enforcement. Laycock summarizes his general rule that plaintiff may
choose specific or substitutionary relief, together with the exceptions, as a "tentative restatement" in his final chapter. Id.
10 Id. at 110-11. Laycock notes that of the cases citing "irreparable injury" in
the West Digest System between January 1980 and December 1989, approximately

1166 of the headnotes are from decisions denying interlocutory injunctions. Id. at
110-11 n.9. While he considers the number of headnotes "only a crude proxy for
the number of cases," he is confident that a "substantial majority of cases invoking
the rule involve interlocutory relief." Id.
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and the court has eliminated the option of "no remedy at all."
When a court invokes the irreparable injury rule to deny permanent
specific relief, it has some particular reason for making plaintiff take
what Laycock regards as the inferior remedy. For example, the first
amendment doctrine of "no prior restraint" openly admits the superior effectiveness of preventive relief, but denies it because of the
substantive law's doctrine that some injury to defendant is preferable to complete prevention of plaintiff's conduct." Other concepts,
such as the "Our Federalism" doctrine, 2 require plaintiff to accept
the collateral costs of proceeding in a hostile forum by deeming
those costs nonexistent and hence not irreparable. This doctrine is
justified on the grounds that policy requires plaintiff to use the forum it wants to avoid.' 3 In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 4 and O'Shea v.
" Id. at 164-68. In this category Laycock includes the doctrine that a plaintiff
will not be specifically compelled to perform a personal services contract. In addition to the traditional explanation that a court cannot effectively enforce the competent performance of highly skilled duties provided by an entertainer, athlete or
executive, he adds his conclusion that the substantive law now rarely enforces
either a damage remedy against a valued employee who jumps his contract or a
covenant not to work for a competitor where no trade secrets or proprietary information are involved. Id. at 168-72 nn.55-73. Laycock sees a "prevailing ethos" in
the substantive law that no person should be directly or indirectly compelled to
work against his will, with the result that the breach of employment contract by
even the most unique and irreplaceable workers has become damnum abusque injuria.
The injury, real and irreparable in fact, is deemed tolerable by modem mores and
hence by the courts. Id.
12 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1974).
13 The classic example of this approach is Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), one of the leading cases stating the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. Bethlehem had a NLRB election enjoined on
the ground that it was not engaged in interstate commerce and that the Board
therefore lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 46-47. As irreparable injury, Bethlehem asserted the disruption to its operations, the expense of contesting the election
before the Board and the expense of ultimately having the election set aside on
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 47-48. The Supreme Court set aside the injunction on the ground that Congress had vested the NLRB, and not the District
Court, with the exclusive power to decide the jurisdictional issue in the first instance. Id. at 50. Justice Brandeis brushed aside the irreparable injury claim:
"[l]awsuits also oftenprove to have been groundless; but no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of a trial to establish the fact." Id.
at 51-52.
In fact, there are several such ways, one being the motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, another being the motion for summary judgment. Bethlehem could
not avail itself of these procedures before the Board and tried to get the equivalent
by preliminary injunction, only to be told that it would have to absorb the cost of
litigating in the forum Congress had established. Its case was not helped by the fact
that after the district court had issued its injunction, the Supreme Court repudiated
the narrow reading of the commerce clause on which Bethlehem's jurisdictional
argument rested. See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937)
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Littleton, 15 the Court refused to place the defendant under judicial
control on the ground that the plaintiffs had not shown any potential future injury that needed prevention. ' 6 All, Laycock argues, can
be explained without reference to the irreparable injury rule.
From his survey, Laycock concludes not only that the irreparable injury rule has ceased to control the case results, but that it
should be abolished by decision or statute, as an obstruction to clear
judicial thinking and as a deterrent to the bringing of winnable cases
for preventive relief.' 7 He would recognize in its place a "tentative
restatement of current decisional law" consisting of a general rule
that "a plaintiff who has prevailed on the merits is presumptively
entitled to choose either a substitutionary or specific remedy" unless there is one of sixteen specific countervailing reasons to deny
her the choice.'"
The book is a remarkable feat of collection, analysis and synthesis. Almost in passing, it throws off ideas that deserve much
lengthier exploration than the book gives them.' 9 In the best inductive tradition of the common law, Laycock takes the existing body of
decisions as observed facts and erects upon them a comprehensive
theoretical structure as a guide to future decisions. Even if Laycock's descriptive scheme is not accepted wholesale, it will challenge
every advocate and judge to explain the grant or denial of an injunction in terms that respond to the specific categories for denying injunctive relief, rather than by blanket reference to lack of irreparable
injury.
The scheme, however, is not purely descriptive. Instead, it
(upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act under Congress's commerce power).
"4 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
'5 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
16 Id. at 220-24.
'7 Id. at 276-83.
18 Id. at 267-74.
19 For example, Laycock suggests that different parcels of real estate viewed in
the capacity of mass-produced housing are far more fungible than the traditionally
based view of land as a unique asset, and that the right to specific performance of a
contract to buy such real estate should therefore be open to question in some circumstances. Id. at 38.
Citing a then-unpublished article, Laycock also suggests that the abolition of
the law-equity distinction should allow interlocutory damage relief in cases where
liability is probable and plaintiff's financial need, such as medical expenses, is
great. Id. at 112 nn. 11-13. See also Wasserman, Equity Transformed--PreliminaryInjunctions to Require the Payment of Money, 70 B.U.L. REV. 623 (1990). Such relief, he
concedes, is almost uniformly disallowed in the cases. LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at
112. Laycock's assertion that personal service contracts have become essentially
unenforceable, see supra note 11, also deserves fuller exposition than he gives it.
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rests on the prescriptive view that except for what can be completely
replaced in an orderly market, money is never an adequate recompense, that an award of damages is in effect a forced sale to defendant of the specific condition plaintiff enjoyed, and that if it can be
avoided, such a sale should never be forced without some countervailing reason. Laycock is what one might call "tenure minded;" he
extends the idea of secure possession in kind from Blackacre to the
most intangible human rights and relations, including contracts. He
rejects the "exchange minded" view that all rights can be effectively
valued and that efficiency should be served by permitting the exchange and paying the value. His tenure orientation appears explicitly in the chapter entitled "Holmes, Posner and Efficient Breach." 2
There, Laycock sets out both economic and moral arguments
against the position that the ordinary contract is merely an option to
perform or pay compensatory damages, and that this option furthers efficiency by permitting contracting parties
to divert their per21
formance to the customer willing to pay most.
Laycock casts contract rights as "entitlements" that allocate
both scarce resources and the risks of changing market values. In
economic terms, efficient breach denies to contracting parties the
certainty they intended to obtain by contracting. If a buyer cannot
cover in times of scarcity, damages based on replacement cost or
even lost profit do not compensate for the consequential injuries of
disrupted customer relations or the transaction costs of finding an
emergency substitute for what the buyer had supposed to be a reliable source of supply. Valuing these costs as consequential damages
is speculative, and the buyer bears both the risk that they will be
undervalued by the courts and the burden of the transaction costs,
such as attorney's fees and time value of delay, in getting them valued and recovered. 22 A rule that gives the buyer the option of performance in kind when she does not want to bear the risk of less
than full compensation encourages long term planning by contract
to reduce uncertainty. Allocation of risk by contract reduces the
cost associated with uncertainty, and efficiency is served when those
who have done so have their expectations confirmed.
In addition to efficiency, Laycock argues that society's ethical
norms require that promises be kept. 2 3 Holmes' "bad man" is, in
Id. at 245.
Id. at 245-60.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 255-59. He cites for this proposition a diverse miscellany of sources,
from the Bible through Hume and Kant to Hannah Arendt and John Rawls. Id. at
255-57 nn.23-32.
20
21
22
23
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his view, exactly that, for our ordinary understanding is not that a
promise implies the alternative of performance or damages. Rather,
Laycock notes, "[tihe dominant cultural understanding appears to
match the ordinary meaning of the language-that a promise of carrots creates a moral entitlement to carrots."2 4
It is unclear whether the "common moral understanding," at
least in some business communities, is as Laycock believes. After
all, "so sue me" is as much a part of the language as "I have
promises to keep." What is clear is that the exchange-minded perspective that Laycock was exposed to at the University of Chicago
did not take. While he believes that the courts cannot accurately
value an exchange, he also finds profoundly repugnant the idea that
defendant can force an exchange upon the plaintiff. His argument
puts little weight on the power that specific performance or an injunction allows the buyer to set the price at which she will agree to
forego performance. Instead, even his economic argument against
efficient breach focuses on the moral concept of contract as an "entitlement."2 5 By asserting that money as such is never adequate
compensation, he attempts to reduce contract damages to the supposedly trivial, albeit numerically common, case where the plaintiff
would voluntarily buy a substitute rather than await a decree of specific performance. Laycock sees in every plaintiff, even the business
man, the old curmudgeon who won't sell Blackacre to developers at
all, or at least at any price a rational buyer would freely pay for it.
For the most part, Laycock wants to protect the old curmudgeon's
tenure as a thing in itself, without concern for the exchange value of
what he holds.
Protecting tenure, however, always involves a commitment by
the court to go beyond even perfect compensation in order to enId. at 259.
Id. at 254. For example, Laycock's "economic" argument often alludes to
moral imperatives. He argues: "[t]hose who plan ahead when shortage is merely a
risk should reap the benefits when shortage comes to pass. Converters and breaching sellers should not be able to reallocate the risk after the fact by taking or keeping
the specific thing and paying damages that cannot be used to replace it." Id.
But his "economic" argument emphasizes protecting settled expectations
rather than who can most effectively find the exchange value of performance in
disturbed conditions. Laycock also touches in passing on the point that specific
performance is a better exchange remedy than damages. The market price is what
a willing buyer and seller will pay and accept. Instead ofa post hoc approximation of
market value, specific performance gives the buyer the option to resell the goods,
either to the defaulting seller or to a third-party, at an agreed price. It can therefore allocate scarce goods more efficiently, with greater accuracy, than allowing the
defaulting seller to resell and then having the court reconstruct the value of the
goods to buyer as a measure of her damages. Id. at 253.
24
25
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sure specific relief. An injunction does not prevent injury or compel
performance merely by virtue of having been issued. It commands
defendant to act or forebear at the pain of sanctions if he disobeys.
These go beyond the compensatory contempt "fine"-in effect,
damages for violating the injunction-to include punitive fine or
definite imprisonment as a punishment for having disobeyed, and
open ended fine, imprisonment or sequestration of property to coerce obedience in the future. Without the meaningful threat of coercion and punishment, preventive relief will in many cases be no
different than damages.
Assume, for example, that plaintiff has obtained a decree that
defendant specifically perform a contract to supply particular goods
that turn out to be otherwise unobtainable during a critical
shortage. If defendant has the goods on hand and delivers, well
enough. If he has them on hand but does not deliver, the court may
send its own officer to put plaintiff in possession by writ of assistance or its equivalent. 26 No personal compliance is required beyond non-resistance to the officer. This result amounts only to an
execution for a money judgment. But what if defendant has already
sold and delivered his supply to a good faith purchaser, 27 or what if
he never had the goods and contracted on the speculation that he
would be able to buy at a lower price than the one at which he was
reselling to plaintiff? Seller can still specifically perform if he, rather
than the plaintiff-buyer, covers and absorbs the price demanded in
the disturbed market. But if he refuses, the court's recourse is some
combination of punitive and open-ended fine or imprisonment. If
these are not used to coerce defendant's compliance, plaintiff is left
with only the remedy of a "compensatory fine," in effect damages.
Whether and how strongly a court will use punitive and coercive measures are matters of discretion. In practice, it depends
upon the court's balancing of the importance of the right at issue,
the flagrancy of defendant's conduct, the harm sanctions will inflict
on defendant, and the value of the court's dignity and authority.
Much depends on the temperament of the individual judge and the
value she places on these factors. As long as the court may refuse to
26 See FED. R. Civ. P. 70. In addition to a writ of assistance, Rule 70 permits the
court to perform an act in the defendant's stead as if he had done it. One example
of this power is conveyance of land by marshall's deed or by judgment for title
when defendant disobeys a decree for specific performance. See generally 12

WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3022 (1973) (detailing the

remedies available in the "enforcement of judgment for specific relief").
27 Plaintiff will ordinarily have sought preliminary relief restraining defendant
from disposing of the goods but will not necessarily have gotten it.
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apply the force needed to make its order effective, however, it is not
accurate to say that the law ordinarily gives a plaintiff preventive or
specific relief at her choice.
Nor is it obvious that the court should commit itself to using
imprisonment simply because plaintiff prefers prevention or relief in
kind. To be obeyed as a matter of routine, authority must be seen to
be obeyed by others. Any time a court grants an injunction, it risks
its own prestige. 28 If it backs down in the face of a recalcitrant defendant, it encourages defiance in future cases. Conversely, it may
sometimes impose exemplary punishment for contempt as a general
deterrent to others even when it is no longer possible to compel
defendant to obey. A court should not grant preventive relief unless
it is willing to commit to using whatever force at hand is necessary to
compel obedience or make an example. Once committed, it can retreat only at the cost of embarrassment to the institution. One may
doubt whether our supposed moral principle that contracts ought to
be kept should make it a crime to breach one no matter how little
plaintiff is injured or inconvenienced.
The irreparable injury rule survives, at least in rhetoric, because
it expresses the factual proposition that preventive or specific relief
implies coercion by fine and imprisonment, and the moral proposition that those sanctions should not be available simply because an
injured plaintiff wants them, even if specific relief makes the plaintiff
more completely whole than an imperfectly computed sum of
money would. Even if exchange is not the virtue that the efficient
breach hypothesis would have it, secure tenure comes with costs
that may make exchange an acceptable second best. Laycock identifies specific situations where the courts will only give second best
relief, but he does not establish that there can or should be no
others. Beyond the specific categories Laycock identifies, the irreparable injury rule stands for a residual distrust, which he evidently
does not share,2 9 of the contempt power that gives specific relief its
effect. The irreparable injury rule can no longer be taken for
granted, but this report of its death may be premature.
28

Rendleman, supra note 1, at 356.

29 LAYCOCK,

supra note 2, at 14-15.

